1.   The valuer shall identify all claims outstanding after the write-down or conversion of capital instruments and the application of any resolution actions and shall assign those claims to the legal and natural persons who were the CCP’s shareholders and creditors at the resolution decision date.

The valuer shall determine the actual treatment of the legal and natural persons who were the CCP’s shareholders and creditors at the resolution decision date in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, except where those persons receive cash compensation as a result of the resolution.

2.   Where the legal and natural persons who were the CCP’s shareholders and creditors at the resolution decision date receive equity compensation as a result of the resolution, the valuer shall determine their actual treatment by providing an estimate of the overall value of the shares transferred or issued as consideration to the holders of the capital instruments, debt instruments or other unsecured liabilities that have been converted. That estimate may be based on an assessed market price resulting from generally accepted valuation methodologies.

3.   Where the legal and natural persons who were the CCP’s shareholders and creditors at the resolution decision date receive debt compensation as a result of the resolution, the valuer shall determine the actual treatment by taking into account the changes in contractual cash flows that result from the write-down or conversion, the application of other resolution actions and the relevant discount rate calculated in accordance with the methodology set out in Article 22(2) of this Regulation.

4.   For any outstanding claim, the valuer may take into account, where available and together with the factors described in paragraphs 2 and 3, prices observed in active markets for the same or similar instruments issued by the CCP under resolution or other similar entities.

5.   The valuer shall also consider the actual direct replacement costs incurred by clearing members and listed in Article 23(2) when comparing the actual treatment of shareholders and creditors in resolution with the valuation for the application of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle.