(a)

the treatment that shareholders, clearing members and other creditors would have received had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP at the time the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met and had the CCP instead been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, following the full application of the applicable contractual obligations and other arrangements in its operating rules;

(b)

the actual treatment that shareholders, clearing members and other creditors, have received in the resolution of the CCP;

(c)

whether there is any difference between the treatment referred to in point (a) of this paragraph and the treatment referred to in point (b) of this paragraph.

(a)

disregard any provision of extraordinary public financial support to the CCP under resolution or central bank emergency liquidity assistance or any central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest terms;

(b)

be based on the losses that would have been realistically incurred by clearing members and other creditors, had the CCP been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, following the full application of the applicable contractual obligations and other arrangements in its operating rules;

(c)

take into account a commercially reasonable estimate of the direct replacement costs, including any additional margin requirements, incurred by the clearing members to reopen within an appropriate period their comparable net positions in the market by considering effective market conditions, including market depth and ability of the market to transact the relevant volume of such net positions within that period; and

(d)

be based on the CCP’s own pricing methodology unless such methodology for price determination does not reflect the effective market conditions.