Article 45
Government financial stabilisation tools
1. In the very extraordinary situation of a systemic crisis, Member States may apply the government stabilisation tools in accordance with Articles 46 and 47 for the purpose of resolving a CCP only where the following conditions are met:
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(a) |
the financial support is necessary to meet the resolution objectives referred to in Article 21; |
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(b) |
the financial support is used only as a last resort in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article after having assessed and exploited all resolution tools to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability; |
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(c) |
the financial support is limited in time; |
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(d) |
the financial support complies with the Union State aid framework; and |
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(e) |
the Member State has, in advance, defined comprehensive and credible arrangements, in a manner consistent with the Union state aid framework, for recovering, over a suitable period, and in accordance with Article 27(10) the public funds deployed, to the extent not retrieved in full through the sale to private purchasers in accordance with Article 46(3) or 47(2). |
The application of government stabilisation tools shall be carried out in accordance with national law either under the leadership of the competent ministry or government in close cooperation with the resolution authority or under the leadership of the resolution authority.
2. To give effect to the government financial stabilisation tools, competent ministries or governments shall have the relevant resolution powers specified in Articles 48 to 58, and shall ensure that Articles 52, 54 and 72 are complied with.
3. Government financial stabilisation tools shall be deemed to be applied as a last resort for the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 1 where at least one of the following conditions is met:
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(a) |
the competent ministry or government and the resolution authority, after consulting the central bank and the competent authority, determine that the application of remaining resolution tools would not suffice to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system; |
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(b) |
the competent ministry or government and the resolution authority determine that the application of remaining resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public interest, where extraordinary liquidity assistance from the central bank has previously been given to the CCP; |
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(c) |
in respect of the temporary public ownership tool, the competent ministry or government, after consulting the competent authority and the resolution authority, determines that the application of remaining resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public interest, where public equity support through the equity support tool has previously been given to the CCP. |