the degree of leverage outside the banking system in the Union and the extent to which the minimum haircut floor framework could reduce that leverage if it became excessive;

the materiality of the securities financing transactions held by institutions in the Union that are subject to the minimum haircut floor framework, including the breakdown of those securities financing transactions which do not comply with the minimum haircut floors;

the estimated impact of the minimum haircut floor framework for institutions in the Union under the two implementation approaches recommended by the Financial Stability Board, namely a market regulation or more punitive own funds requirement under this Regulation, under a scenario in which institutions in the Union would not adjust haircuts to their securities financing transactions to comply with minimum haircut floors, and the estimated impact of the minimum haircut floor framework under an alternative scenario in which institutions in the Union would adjust those haircuts to comply with minimum haircut floors;

the main drivers behind those estimated impacts, as well as the potential unintended consequences of introducing a minimum haircut floor framework on the functioning of the securities financing transaction markets in the Union;

the implementation approach that would be most effective in meeting the regulatory objectives of the minimum haircut floor framework in light of the considerations referred to in points (a) to (d) and taking into account the level playing field across the financial sector in the Union.