An institution shall have a comprehensive stress testing programme for CCR, including for use in assessment of own funds requirements for CCR, which complies with the requirements laid down in paragraphs 2 to 10.

It shall identify possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on an institution's credit exposures and assess the institution's ability to withstand such changes.

The stress measures under the programme shall be compared against risk limits and considered by the institution as part of the process set out in Article 81 of Directive 2013/36/EU.

The programme shall comprehensively capture trades and aggregate exposures across all forms of counterparty credit risk at the level of specific counterparties in a sufficient time frame to conduct regular stress testing.

It shall provide for at least monthly exposure stress testing of principal market risk factors such as interest rates, FX, equities, credit spreads, and commodity prices for all counterparties of the institution, in order to identify, and enable the institution when necessary to reduce outsized concentrations in specific directional risks. Exposure stress testing -including single factor, multifactor and material non-directional risks- and joint stressing of exposure and creditworthiness shall be performed at the counterparty-specific, counterparty group and aggregate institution-wide CCR levels.

It shall apply at least quarterly multifactor stress testing scenarios and assess material non-directional risks including yield curve exposure and basis risks. Multiple-factor stress tests shall, at a minimum, address the following scenarios in which the following occurs:

The severity of the shocks of the underlying risk factors shall be consistent with the purpose of the stress test. When evaluating solvency under stress, the shocks of the underlying risk factors shall be sufficiently severe to capture historical extreme market environments and extreme but plausible stressed market conditions. The stress tests shall evaluate the impact of such shocks on own funds, own funds requirements and earnings. For the purpose of day-to-day portfolio monitoring, hedging, and management of concentrations the testing programme shall also consider scenarios of lesser severity and higher probability.

The programme shall include provision, where appropriate, for reverse stress tests to identify extreme, but plausible, scenarios that could result in significant adverse outcomes. Reverse stress testing shall account for the impact of material non-linearity in the portfolio.

The results of the stress testing under the programme shall be reported regularly, at least on a quarterly basis, to senior management. The reports and analysis of the results shall cover the largest counterparty-level impacts across the portfolio, material concentrations within segments of the portfolio (within the same industry or region), and relevant portfolio and counterparty specific trends.

Senior management shall take a lead role in the integration of stress testing into the risk management framework and risk culture of the institution and ensure that the results are meaningful and used to manage CCR. The results of stress testing for significant exposures shall be assessed against guidelines that indicate the institution's risk appetite, and referred to senior management for discussion and action when excessive or concentrated risks are identified.